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CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS
INSURANCE TRUSTS
By Albert J. Gould, Jr., of the Denver Bar
HIS is an age of efficiency. Everywhere the tendency
is toward more efficient management and organization
of business enterprises. Mergers, consolidations and re-
organizations follow each other in rapid succession and it is
natural, therefore, in such an age, that every effort is being
made to evolve ways and means whereby the control of busi-
ness organizations may not be disturbed in the event of the
death of one of the principal owners, whether his interest be
that of a large stockholder in a corporation or a partner in
a partnership.
At the risk of stating too many elemental principles, I
want first to call attention to some rules of corporation and
partnership law, and wherever stock or stockholders is used
herein reference is made to voting stock or stockholders hold-
ing voting stock.
" 'Close' corporations have been named such because the
members work closely together and do not have to answer to
outside stockholders who have invested nothing but their capi-
tal in the enterprise. It is a matter of record that conditions
in 'close' corporations after the death of one of the stockholders
often are such that the welfare of the business is imperiled
because the members are not accustomed to being associated
with those who do not or cannot contribute their services along
with their capital.
"Many 'close' corporations are doing business today
where the stockholders are mutually working in harmony but
without any preparation against the sudden and unforeseen
introduction of new stockholders. None of the stockholders
would deliberately sell his stock to outsiders because he feels
that he is a partner in a common enterprise and is bound to
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the others by ties of friendship, understanding and experience.
But what about the future?
"At the death of a stockholder his estate passes to the
executor named in his will, or, if he has made no will, to an
administrator appointed by the probate court. Among the
assets of the estate is the stock which he owned. Unless the
will gives directions as to the disposition of the stock the
executor may follow one of two courses. He may turn the
stock over to the beneficiaries of the estate or he may sell to
the highest bidder." If the will does not grant him specific
authority to hold the stock he should, under the law, dispose
of the same. "In case the executor needs funds to pay debts,
administration expenses, inheritance, estate, income and prop-
erty taxes and money legacies, he may be forced to sell in
order to raise the cash.
"The surviving stockholders, then, are" faced with "the
immediate problem of purchasing the stock if it is offered for
sale and they must be prepared to outbid competitors. In the
absence of authority an executor has no power to offer terms
of purchase over a long period of time. The surviving stock-
holders will have to sell their own property to raise the cash
or borrow the funds," if they do not have independent re-
sources. "Otherwise the stock will go to an outsider who may
or may not be acceptable to them.
"If the stock is not put up for sale, but is turned over to
the" legatees or heirs, "four courses are open to the surviving
stockholders: (1) To work for the beneficiaries, i. e., see that
the latter get regular dividends; (2) to work with the bene-
ficiaries, i. e., take them in as officers or employes who will
actively participate in the management; (3) to buy out the
beneficiaries at a price they can agree upon; (4) to freeze
out the beneficiaries, i. e., keep them out of the active manage-
ment, raise salaries, build up surplus, expand the business, in-
crease expenditures and thereby reduce dividends to such a
point that the stock will produce no income for the bene-
ficiaries. The latter will be forced to appeal to a court of
equity where they may or may not succeed in getting relief.
"On the other hand, if the surviving stockholders are dis-
posed to be satisfied to work for the beneficiaries or outside
purchasers from the estate they may find their efforts frus-
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trated by ill advised interference." As a matter of law the
beneficiaries or any outside purchasers from the estate will
have the rights of stockholders and can vote their stock at
annual meetings. "A stockholder who does not -work in har-
mony with the other stockholders can cause confusion and
disruption to such a degree that more time will be spent in
friction than in promoting the business."
"In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the death
of one of the members of a partnership causes its dissolution,
and three alternatives are presented to the survivor. He may
wind up the business and pay the decedent's estate his share
of the proceeds. The objections to this from the survivor's
point of view are too obvious to need elaboration. He may
make an agreement for the continuance of the business with
the heirs and representatives of the decedent; this brings a
new element into the firm which may make further harmoni-
ous work impossible. Or thirdly, he may buy the decedent's
share and continue the business, if he is financially able to do
so and can reach a satisfactory agreement as to price.
"From the viewpoint of the deceased partner's estate the
situation is just as bad. Each partner has a proportionate
interest in the partnership assets, and the interest of the"
deceased "partner naturally passes to his estate. But his estate
is not entitled to the partnership assets,-it is only entitled to
its share of the assets liquidated by the surviving partner.
All partnership assets remain to be administered by the sur-
viving partner. He cannot incur any obligations except those
necessary to liquidate, but in the liquidation he is the czar
and his judgment is final unless the decedent's estate can show
fraud or incompetence. It is frequently necessary for a com-
petent * * * executor to stand by, unable to expedite or hasten
the liquidation, while a somewhat dilatory and none too com-
petent surviving partner works out the liquidation."
The foregoing rules of corporation and partnership law
emphasize the desirability of avoiding such possible situations
if this can be done with reasonable safety and expense. The
best method is provided by the Business Insurance Trust
Agreement, or if that is too elaborate or expensive, then by
modifications thereof, which to the average lawyer may be
of greater importance than the complete form.
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A Business Insurance Trust provides a means whereby
the value of a decedent's interest in a business will be secured
to his estate, while the interest itself passes on to others who
generally are the survivors of the controlling group in the
business.
"With a stock" or partnership "retirement plan in force,"
through a business insurance trust, "each stockholder" or part-
ner "knows definitely what will become of his interest in the
event of his death. He knows he will leave a liquid asset,
probably in cash"-that the amount thereof will represent his
own idea of the value of his interest in the business, and that
he and his heirs or legatees will be protected whether he lives
or dies.
In the average business insurance trust agreement between
partners or principal stockholders, a definite value is placed
upon the interest of each partner or stockholder, or a definite
means of arriving at the same is provided, and it is agreed
that upon the death of any of the parties to the agreement the
interest of the deceased partner or stockholder shall pass to
the survivors upon the payment to a trustee of a definite sum.
In the case of a partnership the trustee delivers the de-
ceased partner's bill of sale to the survivors, whereas in the
case of a corporation, the trustee delivers the stock certificates
of the deceased stockholders to the survivors, and in either
instance, the survivors take the decedent's interest in the pro-
portions prescribed by the agreement. The net result is that
the surviving partners or stockholders pay a definite amount
for the deceased partner's or stockholder's interest and the
amount paid by the survivors represents the deceased person's
own estimate of the value of his interest in the business. The
trustee then pays to the representatives of the estate of the
deceased person the money received by it for the deceased
person's share in the business. The estate receives in cash or
securities, almost immediately after death, without legal com-
plications and without difficulty, what is most apt to repre-
sent the true value of the deceased person's interest in the
business, and the business continues its orderly course.
The Probate Court acquires no jurisdiction over the de-
ceased person's interest in the business in question because the
only claim of the estate is to the fund to be received by it from
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the trustee under an agreement which by its terms is made
binding upon heirs, executors, administrators, assigns, etc.
Such an agreement is called a Business Insurance Trust
because the necessary funds to purchase the interest of the
deceased partner or stockholder through the trustee generally
are provided by life insurance on the lives of the interested
parties.
I shall now discuss some of the most important elements
of the average business insurance trust agreement.
FIRST :-PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS ON INSURANCE.
Premiums on the life insurance may be paid in three
ways: (I) By each partner or stockholder paying the pre-
miums on his own life; (2) by the partnership or corporation
paying all of the premiums; (3) by each partner or stock-
holder paying his proportionate share of the premiums on
the lives of the other parties, based upon the amount of stock
held by each. There are many objections to the first and
second plans which I have not time to discuss here. The third
plan, however, whereby each partner or stockholder pays his
share of the premiums on the lives of the other partners or
stockholders in proportion to his interest in the business is
most widely favored and generally followed.
Under this plan each stockholder or partner is the insurer
of the lives of his co-partners or co-stockholders, but not his
own, and the other parties to the agreement are the co-insurers
of his life. Logically, therefore, when a party to the akree-
ment dies, the survivors are actually furnishing the funds to
buy the deceased party's interest. The partnership or cor-
poration is not a party to the agreement. In this way, the
proceeds of the insurance are put beyond the reach of the
creditors of the corporation or partnership, and the plan of
liquidation cannot be frustrated by them. Also, this plan does
not subject any part of the insurance proceeds to the Federal
estate tax as a part of the estate of the deceased partner or
stockholder. Payment of the premiums is assured by a pro-
vision directing the corporation to make the payments and
charge them to each stockholder's account.
A sample paragraph in Business Insurance Trust Agree-
ments relating to payment of premiums is as follows:
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"The stockholders agree to pay all premiums on the insurance policies
subject to this agreement promptly as they become due and agree that the
insurance proceeds shall be used for the purposes as herein provided. The
proportion of the total premiums on the foregoing policies to be charged to
each stockholder shall be equal to the ratio of the shares standing in his name
to the total shares standing in the names of all of the stockholders who are
parties to the agreement, as set forth in the Schedule. The stockholders hereby
authorize and direct the John Doe Corporation to pay any such amounts as
they become due and deduct the sums so paid from the compensation, dividends
or other amounts payable to them."
SECOND :-METHOD OF DETERMINING VALUE OF
DECEDENT'S INTEREST.
Various methods are used to determine the value of a
deceased person's interest in a corporation or partnership.
The more commonly used methods may be described briefly
as follows:
(1) The price for the first year is stated in the agree-
ment with a provision that a new price be agreed upon at the
end of each year and filed with the trustee, and a provision
for arbitration or for holding over the last price in case of
failure to agree.
(2) The price to be arrived at by a certified public
accountant or appraisal company after the death of a party
to the agreement.
(3) The price to be arrived at, after the death of a party,
by appraisers to be selected by decedent's executor or adminis-
trator, the surviving stockholders and the trustee.
(4) The price to be fixed by multiplying the average
net earnings for the last five years by ten or fifteen or some
other figure as agreed upon.
(5) Another method, known as the New York method,
is to take out of the average earnings what is regarded as a
fair return, say 7%, on the capital invested or book value, and
then capitalize the balance of the earnings at a higher per-
centage, say 15%, and thus arrive at a valuation of good will
to be added to the book value.
The agreement should specify whether or not good will
is to be considered as an asset, and if so, at what figure, and
if no figure is specified, some provision should be made for
arriving at its value. Various methods of computing the
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value of good will are used by tax appraisers and accountants,
but an exact method should be agreed upon.
The most satisfactory method by which to arrive at the
value of a partnership interest or the price of each share of
stock seems to be to have the parties bind themselves to revise
the value or price or reaffirm the last preceding price at each
six month or yearly period, but with the further provision that
if they fail or neglect to do so for a designated period pre-
ceding a party's death, say one year, 18 months or two years,
then a Board of Arbitration or appraisers shall be appointed,
whose sole duty it shall be to determine the then value of the
partner's interest or the price of the stock, using the figures
previously fixed by the parties as a basis and taking into con-
sideration only an increase or decrease in the value from that
time until the date of the party's death.
THIRD :-DISPOSITION OF STOCK WHERE INSURANCE PRO-
CEEDS ARE GREATER OF LESS THAN THE VALUE OF
THE INTEREST TO BE PURCHASED.
Many agreements provide that all of the insurance shall
be paid to the deceased party's estate by the trustee, in the
event and even though the amount of insurance proceeds is
greater than the value of the decedent's interest, but in the
event the insurance proceeds do not equal the value of the
decedent's interest, the survivors generally are given the right
to give their collateral notes for the difference, payable over
a period of time, whereupon all of the decedent's stock is
divided among the survivors in proportion to their holdings
in the company, and then left with the trustee as collateral
security for the payment of the notes.
A typical paragraph reads as follows:
In the event the net proceeds of the insurance policies are not sufficient
to pay for all of the stock, then each party hereto shall have the right to execute
a collateral note for the remainder of the purchase price of the stock to which
he shall be entitled hereunder, and said note shall be payable in ten equal
semi-annual installments and shall be made payable to the order of the executor
or administrator of deceased stockholder's estate and shall bear interest at the
rate of 6% per annum. Upon the execution of said notes and the delivery
thereof to the trustee, said trustee shall cause said stock to be transferred and
to be pledged as collateral security for the payment of said notes and deliver
the same to the executor or administrator of the deceased party's estate.
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If one of the parties cannot be insured, provision is made
for a separate stock retirement fund into which annual pay-
ments are made by the other stockholders and which is held
by the trustee and invested, so that at the death of the un-
insurable stockholder or partner there will be a fund with
which to purchase at least part of his stock. The amount
of the annual payments into the fund will be governed by
the value of the stock and provision should be made for notes
to be signed by the surviving stockholders for the balance
of the value of the decedent's interest, the notes to be secured
by the stock in question.
Most agreements provide that the estate of the deceased
partner or stockholder shall be reimbursed for insurance pre-
miums paid on the lives of the survivors. In other words, the
estate of the partner who has paid the premiums on the lives
of the surviving partners but who received no benefit there-
from due to his prior death should be reimbursed for the
premiums paid in this connection, as well as for payments
made into a stock retirement fund.
FOURTH :-DISPOSITION OF STOCK CERTIFICATES OR PARTNER-
SHIP BILLS OF SALE AFTER EXECUTION OF AGREEMENT.
In corporation business insurance trusts the stock cer-
tificates may be handled in three ways.
(1) The stockholder may retain possession and control
of his own certificate by binding the representatives of his
estate to deliver the same to the trustee at the agreed price.
(2) The stockholder may deposit the stock, endorsed in
blank or with a signed stock power attached, with the trustee
at the time the trust agreement is entered into, but the stock
remains in the name of the depositing stockholder on the books
of the company, so that he receives all dividends thereon and
exercises full voting control during the life of the agreement.
(3) Each stockholder may transfer the title to his shares
to the trustee at the time the agreement is executed.
The second plan whereby the stock certificate is delivered
to the trustee endorsed in blank or with the stock power at-
tached, without in any way interfering with the rights of
ownership in the certificate is the most desirable of the three
methods. Also, the deposit of the stock gives the parties
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greater assurance that the contract will be carried out.
A sample paragraph reads as follows:
Each of the stockholders has executed an assignment in blank of the stock
of the John Doe Corporation standing in his name and has deposited the cer-
tificate (or certificates) with the Trustee as set forth in the Schedule attached
hereto and made a part hereof. Such assignment and deposit, however, shall
in no way affect the right of a stockholder to vote such stock and to collect
dividends thereon as heretofore until such time as the purchase price has been
received by the stockholder or his executor or administrator under the terms of
this agreement.
Across the face of each stock certificate and upon the stub
of the stock book should be written a statement to the effect
that the same is subject to the terms of the business insurance
trust agreement and no stockholder in a close corporation
should have the right to sell his stock during the life of the
trust agreement. A stockholder should not be allowed to
withdraw stock for the purpose of pledging the same as col-
lateral, although this is done sometimes with the understand-
ing that in the event of that stockholder's death the loan first
will be paid out of the proceeds and the remainder of the value
will be paid to the trustee for the estate of the decedent.
FIFTH :-DISPOSITION OF INSURANCE POLICIES.
The insurance policies should be deposited with the trus-
tee and the trustee should be named therein as beneficiary or
the policies should be assigned to it. Some insurance com-
panies believe an assignment to be preferable on account of
certain policy provisions which give the insured certain rights
to benefits during his lifetime unless the policy is assigned.
SIXTH :-FIRST RIGHT TO PURCHASE STOCK OF ANY PARTY
WHO MAY DESIRE TO WITHDRAW FROM BUSINESS.
Most agreements of this sort contain a provision granting
to the parties the first right to purchase stock of any party
thereto who desires to retire from the business prior to the
termination of the agreement. Various methods are used to
determine the value at which the interest may be purchased,
but the best method is the method established by the parties
for the determination of value in the event of death, and this
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is fair to all parties to the agreement. A typical paragraph
in this connection is as follows:
If any stockholder elects to sell any of his stock during his lifetime, he
shall give the trustee and remaining stockholders written notice of his intention
to sell, and the said stockholders shall have the right to purchase such stock
at any time within thirty days from the date of such notice, provided the pur-
chase price is then established, and if not, within thirty days from the date
when such purchase price shall have been established. Each stockholder shall
have the right to purchase a proportion of such stock equal to the ratio which
the shares standing in his name bear to the total shares standing in the names
of all the stockholders who are parties to this agreement. (Then follow pro-
visions relating to the method of determining the value of stock, which usually
is identical with the method for determining the value in the event of death.)
In conclusion, some of the advantages of the business in-
surance trust, in the case of a corporation, may be summarized
as follows:
"(a) Control of the business by the existing manage-
ment is perpetuated.
"(b) The survivors are not placed in the position of
earning dividends for an estate holding a substantial part of
the stock but in no way contributing to the operation of the
company.
"(c) The possibility that a decedent's executor might
sell his stock to outside interests is eliminated.
"(d) The financial welfare of a decedent's dependents
is not contingent upon the successful continuation of a busi-
ness in which he has been engaged.
"(e) A fair value is placed on the stock by the parties
to the agreement."
Some of the advantages of a business insurance trust agree-
ment in the case of a partnership may be summarized as fol-
lows:
"(a) The necessity of a complete liquidation and wind-
ing up of the partnership after its dissolution by the death of
a partner is averted, the business continuing under the con-
trol of the surviving partners.
"(b) The survivors are not placed in the position of
dividing profits with the deceased partner's family who prob-
ably in no way contribute to the operation of the company.
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"(c) The financial welfare of a decedent's dependents
is not contingent upon the successful continuation of a busi-
ness in which he has been engaged.
"(d) A fair value is placed on the partnership interests
by the parties to the agreement.
"(e) Where the insurance is payable to the trustee the
partners have interposed the services of a disinterested party
to assume control of the appraisal of the interest of the de-
ceased, the collection of the insurance proceeds, the payment
thereof to the designated beneficiaries, and the disposition of
the policies on the life of the surviving partners."
Now no doubt many of you are thinking that the fore-
going constitutes a set of fairly accurate statements, but you
are wondering whether Business Insurance Trust Agreements
are not rather rare in this community and therefore of little
importance to the average lawyer. That point of view is justi-
fied to some extent at this time, but business insurance trust
agreements are more or less common in the East and more of
them are in force in this community than most of us realize.
This is a comparatively new field in insurance and today
presents to the life insurance salesman his greatest opportunity
for service with consequent financial gain to himself. Insur-
ance companies here are schooling their men in the sale of
such policies, and we, as lawyers, shall have more and more
to do in the preparation of such instruments in the future.
There are so many advantages to be derived from such agree-
ments it is safe to say the day is not far distant when most
substantial business organizations will have a business insur-
ance trust agreement or some modified form thereof in force
among some or all of its partners or controlling stockholders.
So long as the price to be paid includes all the proper
elements of value, the advantages of the plan far outweigh any
disadvantages, and if the parties are unable, out of their in-
come from the business, to carry sufficient insurance to pro-
vide the entire purchase price, the plan for partial insurance
and the balance by notes should be seriously considered.
The time is near at hand when almost every lawyer will
explain to a client interested in corporate organization work
the principles of the business insurance trust agreement and
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the possible modifications of the same as applied to that cli-
ent's problem; and, in most instances, this will result in a more
satisfied client, a larger fee in return for better services ren-
dered, and, in any event, a feeling upon the part of the client
that his lawyer is keeping abreast of the times,-in short, that
he is efficient.
Bibliography: The Seefurth Service, Chicago; American Bankers Association Pub-
lications; Saving Taxes in Drafting Wills and Trusts, by Robinson.
BARRISTERS AND BROADCASTING
THE BAR COUNCIL'S RULING
(From the Manchester Guardian, of January 30, 1931.)
The General Council of the Bar announces, in its annual
statement, a relaxation of the ruling of 1928 which forbade
practising barristers to broadcast on law. They may now do
so, but it must be done anonymously-"a proviso which, from
the B. B. C. point of view," the official weekly journal "The
Listener" points out, "practically cancels the value of the con-
cession."
The Council is presumably anxious that its members shall
speak only as the mouthpiece of the law they serve, and that
their pronouncements shall be free from personal bias or self-
advertisement. This impersonality, however, is fatal to a suc-
cessful broadcast. Such subjects as the layman might like to
hear discussed are not expounded best by a nameless personifi-
cation of the law. The listener wants to be talked to by a man
whom he recognizes to be an expert in his subject.
AN ANOMALY IN APPELLATE PRACTICE
EFFECT OF CONFESSIONS OF ERROR IN CRIMINAL CASES;
THE RULE IN COLORADO.
By Frank Swancara of the Denver Bar
HE procedure which is taken by appellate courts in most
of the jurisdictions outside of Colorado, when and after
confessions of error are filed in criminal cases, is that
which was followed in an Arkansas case.' The Rev. Elijah
Skaggs "wanted to be hung" in order that he might "on the
third day rise and redeem the world" in his capacity as
"Elijah, King of the Gentiles". He brought about an indict-
ment of himself for the crime of rape, punishable in that state
by hanging. The jury found him guilty of a lesser offense,
and assessed his punishment at 21 years in the penitentiary.
Being thus thwarted in his scheme for the redemption of the
world, he appealed to the Supreme Court. The Attorney
General confessed error as to four different matters. Counsel
for the Rev. Skaggs submitted the case upon such confession.
The Supreme Court proceeded to examine and discuss the
points raised by the Attorney General, and found no reversible
error in the record. The judgment was affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed a judgment of
conviction in a case where the Attorney General had filed a
confession of error, but did so because the confession had
"support in the transcript of the record."'  A like situation
arose in North Carolina. While the appellate court reversed
the judgment, it did not do so merely because of the Attorney
General's admissions. In the opinion the court said :'
"While the opinion of the state's attorney has much weight with us,
it is our practice to examine the record carefully ourselves before setting aside
a conviction for crime."
In a Washington case counsel for appellants who had
been convicted of a crime obtained from the prosecuting at-
torney a stipulation "to the effect that the conduct of the trial
court was prejudicial and reversible error."' The Supreme
Court said:
I. Skaggs v. State, 113 S. W. 346.
2. Tucker v. State, 105 So. 140. Accord: Mo.-State v Goddard, 48 S. W. 82.
3. State v. Stevhens. 69 S. E. II.
4. State v. Waite, 238 Pac. 617.
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"The attorneys, of course, know that we cannot affirm or reverse a case
simply because it is stipulated that there is or is not error in the record."
The Appellate Court in Illinois, in a contempt case, re-
fused to reverse the judgment, notwithstanding the fact that
the State's Attorney had confessed error, "asking that the
judgment be reversed."5
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma has many
times followed the following procedure :'
"Where the Attorney General confesses error, this court will examine
the record, and, if the confession is sustained thereby, and is well founded in
law, the conviction will be reversed."
We come now to the subject of the procedure in Colorado.
The best case from an illustrative standpoint is Richardson v.
People.' There seven persons had been charged with murder
in the first degree. At the conclusion of the trial the jury
found two of them guilty of voluntary manslaughter. A writ
of error was sued out by the convicted defendants, and execu-
tion of a sentence to the state penitentiary was stayed.
In the case in question a vast array of able lawyers pre-
pared, signed, and filed in the office of the Clerk of the Su-
preme Court an abstract of the record and a voluminous and
exhaustive brief on behalf of the plaintiffs in error. There-
after, and on January 9, 1917, the Attorney General then in
office, with two assistant attorneys general, filed a brief on
behalf of the people, contending for an affirmance of the
judgment. On April 13, 1917, the reply brief was filed.
The next step taken in the case was upon September 27,
1917. On that date the succeeding Attorney General filed a
Confession of Error. This had the effect, indirectly, of strik-
ing from the files the brief of the first Attorney General.
According to the "uniform rule," hereinafter discussed, the
court could have disposed of the case the same day as that
upon which the confession was filed. However, no official
announcement was made regarding the cause until January
7, 1918. On that date the court filed the following memoran-
dum:
5. The People v. Mortenson, 224 II. App. 221.
6. Bindrum v. State, 228 Pac. 168; Raymer v. State, 228 Pac. 500: Henderso. v. State, 197 Pac.
720; Green v. State, 193 Pac. 1,077; Scwake v. State, 228 Pac. 168': Brasheers v. State, 192
Pac. 433.
8. 69 Colo. 155, 170 Pac. 189.
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"Per Curiam.
"Plaintiffs in error were convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sen-
tenced to serve terms in the penitentiary. They have assigned and argued
numerous alleged errors occuring in the trial of the cause, which they claim
entitled them to a reversal of the judgment. The prosecution, acting through
the attorney general, has filed a confession of error and asks for a reversal of
the judgment. Onder these circumstances, it is not incumbent upon us to
investigate the record and determine as to the correctness of his conclusions.
We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the cause."
The difference between that pronouncement and what was
said and done by courts in other jurisdictions under like cir-
cumstances is obvious. It was "not incumbent" upon the court
either to "investigate the record" or to examine the brief of
the first Attorney General. The court ignored the existence
or filing of that brief in another respect. The title page fur-
nished to the publishers of the report of the case, as well as
the caption sheet attached to the original memorandum, con-
tained neither the name of the first Attorney General nor the
names of the two Assistant Attorneys General who acted and
appeared in the cause with him. In the reports of other cases
the names of all attorneys who ever appeared are published,
including that of any Attorney General who went out of office
before the cause was determined.'
There is no reason for supposing that the court intended
to assume that the Attorney General was infallible in the
matter of "the correctness of his conclusions." The filing of
a confession of error implies a disagreement, as to a matter
of law, with the prosecuting attorney who tried the case and
with the trial judge who overruled a motion for a new trial,
as well as with any predecessor in office who filed a brief in
support of an affirmance. Such other officials may have been
correct in their conclusions. The reason for the court's action
in reversing, without opinion, the judgment of conviction in
Richardson ;v. People appears but imperfectly in the memo-
randum filed. In an earlier case,1" however, the court said:
"The attorney general has presented a confession of error and asks a
reversal of the judgment.
"It is the uniform rule of this court in such cases to act affirmatively
upon such request of the attorney general. By the Constitution and statutes
9. E. g. Lawson v. People, 63 Colo. 270, 165 Pac. 771.
10. Soto v. People, 64 Colo. 528, 173 Pac. 399.
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of this state the Attorney General is the only person who is authorized by
law to appear for the people, before the Supreme Court. The duty and
responsibility of the control of such cases are his. * * *
"The judgment is reversed."
Obviously, therefore, the reversal of the judgment in
Richardson v. People was not on account of any serious or
reversible error in the record but simply because of the "re-
quest of the attorney general." The request in question is
acted "affirmatively upon" because, it is said, he has "control"
of the case. The Supreme Court of Iowa" has discussed the
question of "control," under statutes not materially different
from ours, but when in a case12 thereafter arising the attorney
authorized to appear for the state filed "a written confession
of errors" the court did not reverse the judgment solely be-
cause of such confession but did so for the reason apparent
from the following language of the memorandum it filed:
"As the errors confessed appear to be prejudicial, the appli-
cation to * * * reverse and remand it, will be granted." The
court first satisfied itself that the alleged errors were in fact
"prejudicial".
In civil actions, where each party has control of his own
case, appellate courts have refused "to reverse the judgment
of a trial court upon an agreement of the litigants that the
judgment of said trial court is erroneous, or upon a confession
of error, unless the record discloses that the trial court's judg-
ment was, in fact or law, erroneous."' 3
In Alabama the refusal was upon the ground that the
confession of error could not be allowed to "oust a court of
its appellate jurisdiction, or limit the principle of decision
by excluding certain legal considerations which may be per-
tinent to the issue.""
Prior to the reversal of the judgment in Richardson v.
People, the main case herein discussed, our Supreme Court
said that "it appears to have been the uniform practice of this
court to reverse the case upon his (the attorney general's)
confession of error, without giving it further consideration,"
but added that inasmuch as the former Attorney General, dur-
II. State v. Fleming, 13 Iowa 443.
12. State v. Bailey, 85 Ia. 713, 50 N. W. 561.
13. Riley v. Commissioners' Court (Tex. C. A. 1929), 12 S. W. 2nd 1072. Atcord: Sivley v.
Sivley (Miss.), 50 So. 552; Webb Sumner Oil Mill v. Southern Coal Co. (Miss.), 91 So. 698.
14. Boss Livery Co. v. Griffith, 85 So. 849.
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ing his term of office, had filed a brief in support of "the
regularity of the conviction, * * *" it is "the better practice
to pass upon some of the assignments of error, or one of them
at least, upon which the present Attorney General has con-
fessed error."'1 The "better practice" was not followed in the
Richardson case, determined later, and so we may conclude
that that practice has been abandoned.
According to the "uniform rule" of reversing a criminal
case upon the confession of error "without giving it further
consideration," the attorney general may confess any error,
trivial, harmless, or otherwise, aihd thereby obtain a reversal
of the judgment upon his mere "request." It lies in his power,
therefore, to prevent the court from applying, and the public
from benefiting by, the rule embodied in the following judicial
pronouncement:
"Where one knowingly and willfully violates the law, and his guilt is
clearly proven, he cannot successfully rely for a reversal on technical errors
occurring during a trial.""6
If it be assumed that an attorney general will always act
honestly and studiously in filing a confession of error, the
fact still remains that he may be mistaken as to the law or
the record. He is as apt to be wrong in making a "request"
for a reversal as he sometimes is in contending for an affirm-
ance.
There is a possibility that the attorney general erred in
filing the confession in the Richardson case. At least the court
could have had plausible, if not unassailable, grounds for
affirming the judgment if the alleged errors were only those
confessed. The confession in that case involved, in substance,
only two points, one concerning an instruction to the jury and
the other relating to remarks of the trial judge (Cavender).
There was a count in the information upon which plain-
tiffs in error had been tried which charged the specific act
of murder to some person unknown to the district attorney, and
then alleged that the defendants were then and there present,
standing by, aiding, abetting and assisting such unknown per-
son to commit the murder. The court instructed the jury that
if defendants "aided, abetted or assisted" the one actually
IS. Lawson v. People, 63 Colo. 270, 165 Pac. 771.
16. May v. People, 236 Pac. 1,022; Gizewski v. People, 239 Pac. 1,026.
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guilty of murder in the commission of such crime, they them-
selves were guilty of murder. The first alleged error con-
fessed consisted in the failure of the trial court to make the
instruction more complete and instruct that the defendants
must also be found to have known the criminal intent of the
person aided or abetted.
The confession of error did not say that the instruction
as given had been objected to, but assuming that a proper
objection had been made, the court might have found the
error, if such it was, not reversible, under the following rule :t"
"An instruction which follows the language of the statute in defining
a principal or an accessory will ordinarily be sufficient, and usually it is better
to do so."
Again, the court might have held the error cured by ver-
dict, which found the defendants guilty only of voluntary
manslaughter. At common law, and under statutes declara-
tory thereof, there cannot be accessories before the fact to
voluntary manslaughter, which is killing in the heat of sudden
passion and without malice," and is, therefore, inconsistent
with the idea of premeditation." Error in defining accessories
is harmless when the verdict is for voluntary manslaughter.
The second alleged error confessed related to remarks of
the trial judge made in connection with rulings on the admissi-
bility of certain evidence or the propriety of certain questions
propounded to witnesses. In the instructions to the jury the
trial court embodied the usual charge to disregard remarks
of either court or counsel made during the progress of the trial.
If the Supreme Court had reviewed the record and ex-
amined all the briefs it might have agreed with the first
Attorney General and his two assistants who had argued for
an affirmance and in conclusion said:
"We conscientiously believe that the defendants here had a fair and
impartial trial and that the verdict of the jury should be affirmed by this
court."
The Richardson case was never retried. It was reversed
nearly four years after the homicide charged was committed,
and more than three years after the trial.
17. I Randall's Instructions, section 314.
1S. Sec. 6,666 C. L. 1921.
19. 29 C. J. 1,066, section 38.
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For reasons hereinbefore indicated, the appellate pro-
cedure in Colorado in criminal cases is such that any criminal
may escape punishment if he or his friends can induce the
attorney general to file a confession of error, or if that official
files such a document because of some mistake on his part.
Some criminal cases are not tried more than once, for reasons
familiar to the profession. Where such cases reach the Su-
preme Court, the attorney general has the power to nullify,
in effect, the provisions of the state constitution relating to
the pardoning power.
If a criminal case is remanded on the "request" of the
attorney general, and never retried, the defendant has all of
the benefits and none of the stigma of a pardon. When the
governor exercises his constitutional pardoning power the
public is aware of the fact, and the executive may be subjected
to adverse criticism. When the attorney general exercises his
indirect pardoning power the people are not familiar with his
procedure, and they may on learning of the "reversal" assume
that the District Attorney had recklessly injected error into
the record and that the trial judge had stupidly permitted him
to do so. Moreover, county officials may be unjustly accused
of having unwisely spent large sums of the people's money in
maintaining a prosecution which did not result in the incar-
ceration of the accused.
Under the "uniform rule" in Colorado a reversal of the
judgment in a criminal case when made upon the "request"
of the attorney general is without any opinion on any point of
law. This situation makes pertinent the following language
of the Court of Appeals of Alabama:
"It would be puzzling to say the least, as to how the trial court would
proceed in another trial of this cause, should we act on the confession of
error, * * * "20
Only in Colorado has it ever been judicially said that
there may be, in a criminal case, a "reversal without com-
ment.1' 1  In other jurisdictions where a reversal occurs fol-
lowing a confession of error either the confession is quoted in
full or the error confessed is so set forth as to enable the trial
court to know how to proceed in the event of another trial. 2
20. Boss Livery Co. v. Griffith, 85 So. 849.
21. Zancannelli v. People, 63 Colo: 252, 254.
22. Bindrum v. State (Okla.), 228 Pac. 168; Harris v. Corn. (Va.), 68 S. E. 834; State v. Ward
(S. D.), 155 N. W. 185.
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THE STRANGE CASE OF MISTER MILLER; OR,
THE WICKERSHAM REPORT VINDICATED.
The vicious attacks made upon the Wickersham report by the friends of
the saloon and the enemies of good government, good morals, good judgment,
good times and the Republican party have, through research instituted, spon-
sored, subsidized and carried on by the Editors, brought to light a great deal
of interesting and useless information. It's like this: It appears that the
enemies aforesaid have pointed out and have in fact insisted that the Wicker-
sham report is more in consonance with the last syllable of the chairman's
name than anything else they can think of, and in support of their unfounded
assertions they say that it is contrary to all precedent and a violation of
judicial ethics for a commission of eleven members to hand down a unani-
mous opinion and eleven dissenting ones. At first blush and no doubt to
lawyers less learned and astute than the Editors this proposition seems to
have merit. It has none. The mere fact that more judges are for you than
against you is far from meaning you will win. Witness the strange case of
Mister Miller who in three courts had eight underpaid judges in his favor
while Monsieur O'Brien, his opponent, could muster only five hungry jurists.
To wit: 27 Colo. App. 511 ; 64 Colo. 43.
BOX SCORE
For Monsieur O'Brien For Mister Miller
District Judge Court of Appeals Judges
Burke Cunningham








For Monsieur O'Brien, five. For Mister Miller, eight. O'Brien
wins!
SECOND WARNING
The Grand Jury is in session.
MILK IS A NATURAL PRODUCT
Any one who doesn't believe that Chief Justice Adams believes that
milk is not artificially prepared has two ready sources of information. 1. He
may apply to any regular and well governed cow. 2. He may examine
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Climax Dairy Company v. Mulder, 78 C01o. 407, 414. Yes, and he can
do both for all we care.
A second reference to this celebrated example of fearless and independent
judicial courage is made necessary through the careless failure of the people
who have to print this stuff to give the foregoing citation in 8 Dicta (4) 24,
(q. v.).
IS THE MOFFAT TUNNEL A NATURAL
PRODUCT?
The answer to this question depends upon whether the Federal courts
have the proper respect.
Also, whether you would rather be a tunnel commissioner or a jail
bird or both.
For an exhausting account of the entire transaction consult Sweet on
Holing In, DICTA for February, 1931.
IS DICTA ENTITLED TO YOUR SUPPORT?
An open letter to Messrs. Ray M. Beebe, Foster Cline,
E. P. Hudson, A. D. Quaintance, Carle Whitehead and Albert
L. Vogl.
Gents: Is the well being of the telephone company more to you than
the well being of the chaste pages of this family journal and magazine of
uplift? Do you know that for Dictaphun alone we pay $2.50 per word with
semi-colons counted as overtime?
Yours truly,
DICTA, 828 Symes Bldg., Denver.
THE LAWYERS GET THE FEATHERS
"In the ornithologd of litigation this case is a tomtit, furnished with
a garb of feathers ample enough for a turkey. . . . It seems to us that a more
contracted plumage might serve for so small a bird. . . . In every forensic
season, we have a considerable flock of such cases, to be stripped and dissected
for the cabinets of jurisprudence. We efideavor to pick our overfledged
poultry with judicial assiduity and patience." Lukens v. Ford, 87 Ga. 542.
TRUE, BROTHER, TRUE
Eugene H. Angert of the St. Louis Bar: "The careers of certain
judges are a demonstration that in law as in baseball, when a man fails to
make a hit they send him to the bench."
GRANT, ELLIS, SHAFROTH AND TOLL
(q. v.)
COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDITOR's NOTr.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)
RECEIVERS- UNLAWFUL PREFERENCES - EXCESSIVE FEES-
BANKRUPTCY-No. 12569-Rossi vs. Colorado Pulp &
Paper Co., et al.-Decided January 12, 1931.
Facts.-This matter involves the winding up the affairs
of the Colorado Pulp & Paper Company, an insolvent domes-
tic corporation in the hands of a Receiver, who held under
the appointment of the District Court of Adams County.
After such appointment, the District Court temporarily lost
jurisdiction by petitions in Bankruptcy, but the jurisdiction
of the State Court was subsequently restored by the uncondi-
tional dismissal of the petition in Bankruptcy, before the
administration of the Bankrupt's Estate, and the State Court
then proceeded to its final determination. This matter was
brought to the Supreme Court by William Rossi, a general
creditor to review the various orders and decrees of the Dis-
trict Court.
Held.-1. General creditors, having repeatedly dealt
with the Receiver in his official capacity and obtained Court
orders that involved recognition of his appointment, thereby
acquiesced in such appointment and cannot now complain of
such appointment on the ground of mere irregularities.
2. Even though such appointment of a Receiver is not
set aside for above reasons, it is not a recognition of the pro-
priety of such Receivership.
3. The Receivership should never have been granted in
the first instance.
4. The filing of a petition in Federal Court in Bank-
ruptcy divests the State Court of jurisdiction.
5. Such filing deposed the Receiver and deprived him
of any further duties, except to preserve the estate.
6. The stipulation entered into between certain of the
parties, which did not include the general creditors, was void
as against general creditors.
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7. The general creditors were not estopped from attack-
ing the stipulation.
8. The illegal stipulation acted as a parasite to aid in
sapping the lifeblood of the Receivership's general assets
almost from the start. It has robbed the general creditors of
representation in the person of a receiver, who should have
been unbiased and impartial.
9. The office of a Receiver is in the nature of that of
a Trustee, and the trustee was unfaithful.
10. The practice of throwing business concerns into
Receivership by the District Court must be discouraged,
where grounds for such Receivership are flimsy.
11. In this case the Receivership was improvident, and
unconscionable expenses and costs were incurred.
12. The Receivership never should have been com-
menced, but having been started, should have been ended
long ago.
13. The Court has authority to wind up the corporation
even though the original suit did not include the dissolution
of the corporation.
Judgment reversed 'with directions.
NOTE: In the two cases of Myers vs. Beck and Myers vs. Colorado Pulp &
Paper Co., both decided on January 12, 1931, the facts were the same as in the above
case and both were reversed for the same reasons.
RECEIVERSHIP-UNLAWFUL PREFERENCES-EXCESSIVE FEES
-BANKRUPTCY-No. 12590-Sparling Coal Co. vs. Colo-
rado Pulp & Paper Co., et al.-Decided January 12, 1931.
Facts.-The facts were the same as in the case of Rossi
vs. Colorado Pulp & Paper Co. et al.
Held.-The Court in its discretion may notice any other
error appearing of record, even though the error is not as-
signed. In liquidation proceedings, the rights of creditors,
debtors, and stockholders, are to be determined as of the time
when it commences. Creditors of a Receivership whose
claims have been proved and allowed under a decree, have a
right to be heard in that Court upon any action of the Court
or receiver, by which they might claim to be aggrieved.
DICTA
Allowances of fees, made by the District Court, while a




Denver Park & Amusement Co. vs. Kirchoff-Decided
January 12, 1931.
Facts.-Denver Park and Amusement Company owned
certain real estate, which it leased to one, Throckmorton, who,
with its consent, assigned to The Denver Greyhound Racing
Association. The American National Bank, as Trustee for
bondholders, held a mortgage on the property, and the Grey-
hound Company erected thereon and operated, a dog-racing
enterprise, in which gambling was indulged in on the races.
Kirchoff, having furnished material and labor, filed his
mechanics' lien statement and brought the action to foreclose.
Other lien claimants brought counter claims for foreclosure
of their liens. One of the defences of the owner of the land
was that Kirchoff, in furnishing the material, knew that it was
being furnished for the purpose of erecting a racetrack for
racing dogs, and for the purpose of gambling and wagering in
violation of the laws of the state. The Court below sustained
a demurrer to this defense.
Held.-The demurrer to this particular defence should
not have been sustained. This defence set out an attempted
enforcement of an illegal contract as to which the parties




-City and County of Denver vs. Mason-Decided January
19, 1931.
Facts.-Mason had judgment for $1250.00 for damages
to her property during 1925, 1926, and 1927, as the result of
the negligence of the City in the construction and maintenance
of certain sewers. The City contended that no liability existed
for injuries sustained as the result of the exercise of its quasi
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judicial discretion in the adoption of a defective or insufficient
sewer system, and that no negligence was shown in the con-
struction and maintenance thereof.
Held.-Where a sewer, as originally planned and con-
structed, was found to result in direct and physical injury to
the property of another, that would not otherwise have hap-
pened, and which, from its nature is liable to be repeated and
continuous, but is remediable by a change of plan, or the
adoption of prudent measures, the municipal corporation is
liable for such damages as occur in consequence of the original
cause, after notice and an omission to use ordinary care to
remedy the evil.
Judgment affirmed.
PLEADING - DEMURRER - INTERVENTION - APPEAL - No.
12412-The Commercial Credit Co. vs. John A. Higbee-
Decided January 19, 1931.
Facts.-In an action brought by the defendant in error
against another, an automobile was attached as the property
of the defendant below, who was not a party on appeal. The
plaintiff in error, claiming ownership, filed a petition of
intervention; to this petition, the defendant in error, plaintiff
below, interposed a demurrer which was sustained. The
intervenor elected to stand on its demurrer. Other than sus-
taining the demurrer and fixing a time for tendering a bill
of exceptions, no other orders were made, and no final judg-
ment entered.
Held.-Entry of final judgment is requisite to the right
to predicate and prosecute error.
The Writ is dismissed, but without prejudice to further
appropriate proceedings in the court below.
BROKERS - REAL ESTATE COMMISSION - PLEADING - No.
12253-Kinney vs. Wither-Decided January 19, 1931.
Facts.-Defendants below employed the plaintiff Kinney,
real estate broker, to sell land, and agreed to pay him as a
commission $2,190.00, the first half of the commission to be
paid out of the first cash payment of the purchase price, and
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the second half out of the second payment. The defendants
paid the first half of the commission, but not the second half.
The complaint alleged that the defendants accepted as pay-
ment in lieu of the second cash payment the promissory note
of the purchaser, later brought an action against the purchaser,
recovered judgment, and realized on the judgment more than
the amount of the balance due on the commissions.
Held.-It was not essential to plaintiff's recovery to prove
that the defendants accepted the note of the buyers as the
equivalent of actual payment because when the defendants
brought suit against the buyers to recover the second payment
of the purchase price, and realized therefrom more than the
second half of the commission, the defendants were liable
for the payment of the balance of the commission.
Judgment reversed and remanded 'with instructions.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PART PERFORMANCE-No. 12757-
Jutten vs. Deeble-Decided January 19, 1931.
Facts.-Deeble and Jutten made an oral contract where-
by the former agreed to sell, and the latter agreed to buy,
certain real estate. Claiming Jutten refused to carry out the
contract, Deeble sued Jutten for specific performance, and
obtained a decree therefor.
Held.-1. The Court below found that there was a con-
tract, and that the consideration was $1,600.00. This finding
is conclusive, being upon conflicting evidence.
2. Defendant pleaded Statute of Frauds, claiming that
because the contract was oral, it was unenforceable. How-
ever, Jutten paid $100.00 on the purchase price and the seller
ousted his tenant and delivered possession to Jutten, the pur-
chaser. There was a partial performance of the contract
sufficient to take it out of the Statute of Frauds.
Judgment affirmed.
MANDAMUS - CIVIL SERVICE - CHIEF CLERK-VACANCY-
No. 12661-Civil Service Commission vs. People, ex rel.
Beates-Decided January 26, 1931.
Facts,.-Beates, an employee in the office of the Secretary
of State brought mandamus action to compel Civil Service
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Commission to certify for and appoint her to the position of
Chief Information Clerk, Motor Vehicle Department. She
was second on eligible list, but the one prior on list had never
been tendered nor had ever refused the appointment.
Held.-It not having been shown that the first person
on the eligible list had either been tendered or had refused
such appointment or had failed to make demand therefor
upon request of relator, the second on the list, obviously re-
lator had no clear legal right to demand the position sought
and therefore cannot maintain mandamus.
Judgment reversed.
MANDAMUS-SCHOOL DISTRICT-JOINT DISTRICT-BOUNDA-
RIES--No. 12367---Smith vs. Joint School District No. 3-
Decided January 26, 1931.
Facts.-This was a mandamus action brought by Joint
School District number 3, lying partly in Otero county and
partly in Crowley county, against Smith, County Superintend-
ent to compel her to correct records of her office so as to show
the correct boundaries of school district number 16, of Otero
county, and School District number 3, lying partly in Otero
and Crowley counties, particularly as to show that sections 5
and 6 were part of Joint School District number 3.
Held.-I. Joint School District number 3 had capacity
to sue because even though irregularly created, it has been
recognized as a school district for over twenty years, and its
existence as a legal entity throughout that period had never
been questioned.
2. Mandamus is the proper remedy because it only
required a ministerial act, that of a county superintendent to
correct her records showing the proper boundary.
3. School District number 16, of' Otero County, was
not a necessary party, nor were the bondholders thereof, be-
cause no relief was sought against School District No. 16,
nor any of the bondholders.
Judgment affirmed.
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AUTOMOBILES-RIGHT OF WAY-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
-No. 12419-Knifer vs. De Julio, et al.-Decided January
26, 1931.
Facts.-In an automobile damage suit, defendants in
error, defendants below, had judgment upon a verdict directed
by the District Court. Plaintiff was driving an automobile
South on country road. Defendant was driving his car East
on an intersecting road. Plaintiff testified that he saw defend-
ant's car approaching the intersection at approximately 150
feet therefrom at an excessive rate of speed and on the wrong
side of the road, that plaintiff's brakes were in good condition,
and that he had ample time to stop, but did not do so. The
collision resulted.
Held.-The plaintiff, by his own testimony was clearly
guilty of contributory negligence, and the facts being un-
disputed, it was the duty of the lower court to so hold as a
matter of law and direct a verdict.
Judgment affirmed.
BILLS AND NOTES-USURY-MONEY LENDERS' ACT-No.
12693-Angleton and Yeargan vs. The Franklin Finance
Co.-Decided January 26, 1931.
Facts.-Angleton and Yeargan, plaintiffs, co-makers on
a note payable to Franklin Finance Company brought action
to cancel their liability thereon. They were successful in the
County Court, unsuccessful in the District Court. Contention
was that loan being for less than $300.00 and more than 12
per cent having been charged, concealed in brokerage charges
and other items, that the note was void.
Held.-The amount which the lender actually loans the
borrower will determine whether or not the transaction comes
within chapter 63 compiled laws of 1921. In this case, the
defendant was attempting to avoid the consequences of a viola-
tion of the money lenders' act. The amount of the loan being
under $300.00 and defendant having made charges in addi-
tion to the statutory amount allowable, the contract is void




BANK STOCKHOLDERS' LIABILITY-No. 12354-Campbell
vs. Hoch-Decided January 26, 1931.
Facts.-Hoch sued Campbell on her promissory note.
Defense was no consideration, misrepresentation, and that the
minds of the parties never met. Campbell was owner of
shares of the capital stock in First National Bank of Yuma.
The capital stock became impaired and it was necessary to
levy an assessment. Before assessment was levied, stockholders
met and agreed to raise the necessary money that would be
required by an assessment and defendant gave her note for her
respective quota.
Held.-l. There was ample consideration for the note.
2. There was no misrepresentation.
3. The minds of the parties met.
4. She was liable on the note.
Judgment affirmed.
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